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I.
The
Opening Brief seeking to minimize its participation in a prior matter initiated by A11aconda
Investments, LLC ("Anaconda") and Portfolio FB-Idaho, LLC ("Portfolio") against the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), which matter was adjudicated and resolved in
United States District Court for the State of Idaho (hereinafter refen-ed to as the "Federal
Case"). 1 Stilwyn seeks to characterize its participation in the Federal Case as one in which it
simply intervened in a declaratory judgment action between these parties.

However, such

representations are belied by the actual record of the proceedings in the Federal Case.
First, the Federal Case involved more than just Anaconda/Portfolio's seeking
declaratory judgment establishing its right to an interest in

subject property as it also included

the FDIC' s counterclaim against those same parties for slander of title involving the same parcel
of real property.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, the record of the proceedings also

establishes that after Stil'w')'n voluntarily sought to intervene and subject itself to federal
jurisdiction with regard to the claims at issue in the Federal Case, it was no mere bystander to
those proceedings. Rather, as it acknowledged in filings made in those proceedings, Stilwyn
"actively" sought to pursue its rights under a slander of title claim. (R. Vol. 2, p. 321.) However,
after having interjected itself in the Federal Case and pursued its claim for slander of title,

1

In presenting its arguments in this Respondents' Brief, it must be acknowledged, as it was
below, that Idaho First Bank's position in this litigation is similarly aligned to those of these
responding parties. As such, the arguments advanced by Idaho First Bank in its Respondent's
Brief are joined and incorporated herein.
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Stilwyn abandoned its efforts in the Federal Case and determined instead to initiate a separate
litigation on the very same claim slander oftitle claims in the Fifth Judicial District Court for the
State of Idaho (hereinafter referred to as the "State Case") against these Respondent-Defendants
(hereinafter referred to as the "Page Respondents"). 2
The District Court in the State Case was not distracted by these efforts of Stihvyn to
subsequently recharacterize the nature and scope of its participation in the Federal Case. The
District Court properly applied the principles of claim preclusion to hold that Stihvyn was barred
from asserting the very same claims in the State Case that should have been litigated by Stilwyn
in Federal Case, even if they were not actually litigated by Stilwyn. This Court should conclude
likewise and affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Page Respondents.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In large part, the underlying facts necessary for resolution of this matter are not in
dispute. Stilv,ryn correctly notes, as did the District Court, that this case has its origins in the
efforts of a group of private investors (the Page Respondents) through the legal entities they
established (Anaconda and Portfolio) to acquire the rights to the Stilwyn loan. The Stihvyn loan,
originally possessed by the First Bank of Idaho, had been put up for auction by the FDIC upon
First Bank ofldaho's failure, and the Defendant-Respondent Idaho First Bank of McCall ("IFB")
had been the successful bidder for the Stihvyn loan. Thereafter, the FDIC objected to the IFB's

2

For purposes of this brief, "Page Respondents" shall refer to Michael Page, Michael Edward Page Trust,
Michael Page 2008 Revocable Trust, John Sofro, Bryan Furlong, Wali Investments, LLC, David Wali,
Anaconda Investments, LLC, Anaconda Managers, LLC, Po1tfolio FB-Idaho, LLC, Rokan Property
Services, LLC, Rokan Financial Services, LLC, and Robert A. Kantor.
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attempt to sell and/or assign the Stihvyn loan to Anaconda, which objection ultimateiy resulted
in the rescission of IFB's successful bid of the Stilwyn loan. Portfolio, who had been assigned
Anaconda's interest in the Stihvyn loan, along with Anaconda itself, sought to establish its rights
in the Stilwyn loan by way of a declaratory judgment action against the FDIC in the Fifth
Judicial District for the State of Idaho.
It is at this point in the procedural history between these parties where, although truly not
in dispute, Stihvyn seeks to downplay the actual course of events which transpired between the
parties. For example, at page 3 of the Appellant's Brief, Stilwyn correctly identifies the fact that
the FDIC removed Anaconda/Portfolio's declaratory judgment action against it to the United
States District Court for the State of Idaho. Stilwyn then proceeds to discuss the federal court's
disposition of Anaconda/Portfolio's declaratory judgment claim, making no mention of the fact
that upon removal the FDIC asserted a counterclaim against Anaconda/Portfolio alleging that
their continued claim of an interest in the property, which secured the Stilwyn loan, gave rise to a
claim for slander of title. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 147-157.) Stilwyn's acknowledgement of the FDIC's
counterclaim is only casually mentioned several pages later and, despite its acknowledged
presence, does not stop Stilvvyn from continually characterizing the Federal Case throughout its
Appellant's Brief as solely a "declaratory judgment action". (Appellant's Brief, pp. 5 & 13.)
However, the presence of the FDIC's counterclaim for slander of title cannot be
overlooked. In fact, also understated by Stilwyn in its recitation of the prolonged procedural
history between these parties is the fact that Stihvyn itself specifically identified the harm it
would suffer as a result of Anaconda/Portfolio continued assertion of an interest in the real
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property secured by the Stilwyn loan as the basis for its right to intervene in the Federal Case in
the first instance. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 221-246.) Based on this assertion it made in its Motion to
Intervene, tbe federal court granted Stihvyn's request to intervene in the proceedings as a matter
of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). (R. Vol. 1, pp. 248-257.) In granting Stihvyn's
motion to intervene as a matter of right, Stilwyn did not limit the scope of its participation nor
did the federal court place any conditions or restrictions upon its participation in the Federal
Case. (Id.)
Accordingly, and also unstated by Stilwyn in its recitation of the procedural history, is
that upon its intervention in the Federal Case, Stilwyn actively participated in the litigation and
did not limit its pai1icipation to issues solely pertaining to Ananconda/Portfolio's declaratory
judgment claim against the FDIC. Rather, it also actively participated "consistent with its stated
intention to pursue the slander of title claim" in the Federal Case, including the serving of written
discovery on Anaconda/Portfolio as well as participating in and taking depositions of a number
of witnesses. (R. Vol. 2, p. 326-328.)3
Significantly, it should be noted that this characterization of Stilwyn's active participation
is not merely the Page Respondents casting of its actions, but rather the express representation
that Stilwyn itself made to the federal court when it sought, six weeks prior to trial, to "confirm"
its status as party to the slander ohitle claim in the Federal Case. As Sti1Vvyn represented:

3

Stilwyn specifically identified the activities it took consistent with "its stated intent to pursue
the slander of title claim" within its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Confinn Status As A
Party to Slander of Title Counterclaim. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 327-328.)
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Stilv.;n has actively pursued its rights against Anaconda under the slander of title
claim, including participation in the status conference regarding that claim and
setting a trial date, serving discovery requests, receiving discovery responses,
noticing and taking depositions, all in preparation for the Court trial set for July
11,2011.
(R. Vol. 2, p. 321.)

However, despite its intervention as a party in the Federal Case and its indisputable active
pursuit of its rights against Anaconda under the slander of title claim, Stilwyn determined to
withdraw its assertion of the slander oftitle claim. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 340-342.) In so doing, it did
not receive any judicial approval for its purported attempt to remove its slander of title claim
from the Federal Case nor did it obtain the consent of any of the parties to the Federal Case for
its removal without prejudice from those proceedings. Rather, as Stilwyn acknowledges, the
matter was dismissed "in its entirety" and Stih:vyn made no objection to the federal court's entry
of dismissal with prejudice of the Federal Case. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 344-356.)
Upon the dismissal of the Federal Case, Stihvyn initiated the present litigation in State
Case seeking to asse1i the very same claims that it had already actively litigated in the Federal
Case. (R. Vol.I, pp. 17-43.) Accordingly, on March 9, 2013, IFB filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment, asserting that as a result of Stilwyn's involvement in the Federal Case, Stilwyn's
claims in the State Case were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 381383.) The remaining Page Respondents joined IFB's Motion, providing supplemental arguments
specifically identifying why IFB's assertion of claim preclusion as against Stilwyn was equally
applicable to them in view of their relationship to the transaction in question. (R. Vol. 2, pp.
427-429, 45-456.)
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23, 2013,

District Court entered

correctly holding that Stilwyn's claims in the State

Motion for Summary
Case were

Decision Granting

under the doctrine of res judicata as such claims, if not actively pursued in the

Federal Case by Stilwyn, should have been litigated therein. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 1091-1101.) The
District Court entered its Amended Judgment dismissing all claims against all Defendants on
September 12, 20 i 3 and this appeal by Stilwyn followed.
HI.

A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Concluded That, Upon Stihvyn's Voluntary
Determination To Intervene As a Party In The Federal Case And Active
Participation Therein, Stilwyn's Claims In These Proceedings Were Barred
By Res judicata (Claim Preclusion).

As noted above, Stilwyn begins its attack on the District Court's opinion by
mischaracterizing the nature of the Federal Case and further minimizing its involvement therein
all

an effort to bolster its assertion that it did not, nor was it ever compelled to, assert the

claims that it seeks to present in these proceedings.

However, as the foregoing procedural

history demonstrates, the Federal Case was not simply a "declaratory judgment action" initiated
by Anaconda/Portfolio, as the Federal Case also included the FDIC's assertion of a counterclaim
alleging slander of title. Moreover, the foregoing also refutes Stihvyn's attempt to characterize
its involvement in those proceedings as "simply" joining the Federal Case as an intervenor. The
record demonstrated that Stihvyn voluntarily chose to intervene in the Federal Case without
reservation or limitation and did so based on the express assertion that it possessed the right to
intervene as a result of the Ananconda's purported wrongful claim of an interest in the real
property secured by the Stilwyn loan. Moreover, the record also shows that Stilwyn further
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expressly identified the intent of its intervention by requesting judicial confirmation of its status
as a counter-claimant joining in the FD I C's siander oftitle cause of action.
Were such representations by Stilwyn of its limited nature and scope of its participation
in the Federal Case of any merit, one would have to wonder what purpose Stihvyn actually had
in voluntarily seeking to intervene in the Federal Case in the very first instance and why with
such minimal involvement it undertook such costly activities. However, such an inquiry is just
as academic

as consideration of the Stilwyn's chief defense to the application of claim

preclusion. Stilwyn argues at pages 12-20 that, as it was merely an intervenor to the Federal
Case, there were no claims by an "opposing party" asserted against it and therefor it could not be
compelled by Rule 13(a) to assert any counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise, against any party
to those proceedings. This inquiry is wholly unnecessary as the record establishes without
question the correctness of the District Court's ultimate holding that having chosen the Federal
Case as the forum for its claims, Stilwyn cannot now reassert them in these proceedings. For this
reason, the newly cited cases4 by Stihvyn addressing the necessity of a claim by an "opposing
party" is inapplicable to the present case as none of those cases address a scenario where a party
intervenes as a matter of right against the assertion of certain claims and thereafter actively
pursues its own interest in those proceedings as Stilwyn did in the Federal Case.
As noted above, although the original proceedings in the Federal Case involved only
Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC, Stilwyn filed a Motion to Intervene as a matter of right
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pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). (R. Vol. 2, pp. 221-224.) In so doing, Stilwyn expressly
stated that its intervention was necessary because Anaconda/Portfolio's filing of a lis pendens
had piaced a cloud on the property and caused it damage. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 222.) Significantly, in
seeking to intervene in the action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), Stihvyn did not seek to limit
its participation in the Federal Case, nor were any conditions to its intervention as a matter of
right imposed by the federal court. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 248-257.)
This fact is of substantial import as it is well recognized that "[w]hen a party intervenes,

it becomes a full participant in the lawsuit and is treated just as if it were an original party."

Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit has recognized that where an intervenor is added pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
24(a)(2), it enters "the suit with the status of original parties and are fully bound by all future
court orders." United States v. State of Or., 657 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1981). As a result,
"[b ]y successfully intervening, a party "makes himself vulnerable to complete adjudication by
the federal court of the issues in litigation between the intervener and the adverse party." Id.,

quoting 3B Moore's Federal Practice P 24.16(6), at 24-67] to 24-673 (2d ed. 1981). See also, 7A
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedures 1920 (1972).
Thus, Stihvyn's entire argument about the necessity of an "opposing party" in order for
claim preclusion to apply in this case is without application in the context of this case. Stihvyn,
by virtue of its voluntary determination to intervene as a matter of right in the Federal Case,

While Stilwyn advanced this lack of "opposing party" argument below, on appeal it seeks to
bolster its position with a series of cases which were not presented to the District Court in the

4
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placed itself in the adversarial position with the plaintiffs therein such that it not only subjected
itself to whatever relief might be afforded to those plaintiffs, but also, by logical extension the
consequence of any relief it either sought or could have sought in those proceedings.
Having entered the Federal Case just as if it were an original party, the record reveals that
Stihvyn proceeded with the asse1iion that the actions of the plaintiffs therein constituted a slander
of title for which it was entitled to a remedy. As Stihvyn represented to the federal court in its
Motion to Confim1 Status As A Pruty To Slander of Title Counterclaim:
Stilwyn has actively pursued its rights against Anaconda under the slander of title
claim, including participation in the status conference regarding that claim and
setting a trial date, serving discovery requests, receiving discovery responses,
noticing and taking depositions, all in preparation for the Court trial set for July
I 1, 2011.
(R. Vol. 2, pp. 321.)
Thus, an examination of the procedural history of the Federal Case conclusively
establishes that not only did Stilwyn by virtue of its intervention subject itself to the jurisdiction
of the federal comt as if it were an original party in the Federal Case, it "actively pursued"
litigation in supp01t of its claim of slru1der of title. There is simply no need for a hypothetical
analysis to be applied with regard to under what circumstances a pariy with no claims asserted
against it by an "opposing party" must nonetheless assert claims or risk the bar of res judicata.
Stihvyn inserted itself into the Federal Case, made itself subject to the plaintiffs' claims therein

and, as a result, was not only compelled to assert any claims it had against those same plaintiffs,

first instance. (Appellant's Brief, page 18-20.)
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it, in fact, did so. Accordingly the District Court correctly concluded that res judicata applied
and dismissed all claims against all Defendants.

It should be noted this conclusion is wholly in accord with the principles and purposes

which underlie the application of I.R.C.P. 13(a) and t.½e doctrine of claim preclusion. Although
distinct legal principles, there is a uniformity of purpose in the requirement of I.R.C.P.13 which
compels a party to a litigation to bring any claim it believes it possess against any opposing party
arising from the same transaction or occurrence and the consequence imposed by the doctrine of
claim preclusion resulting from a party's failure to pursue such a claim in a prior litigation. 5
Compare Blaser v. Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 456, 776 P.2d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating

that "the policy behind Rule 13(a) is to avoid multiple lawsuits between the parties to a
transaction or occurrence.") and Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002)
(recognizing that res judicata principles serve the fundamental purposes of the preventing
repetitious litigation and the harassment ofrepetitive claims).
This overlapping purpose behind the identification of compulsory counterclaims and
application of claim preclusion has been recognized by the federal courts. See e.g., Publicis
Commc'n v. True N. Commc'ns Inc., 132 F.3d 363,365 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating "[t]he definition

of a compulsory counterclaim~a claim that "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is

5

As a result, it should not be surprising that the interpretation of each is given a broad
construction. See Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 259, 668 P.2d 130, 135 (Ct. App. 1983)
(stating, "the transactional concept of a claim is broad, and that the bar of claim preclusion is
similarly broad.").
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matter of the

party's claim"-mirrors

triggers a defense of

preclusion (res judicata) if a claim was left out of a prior suit.
None of these principles of judicial economy or efficiency are served by permitting
Stilv,;yn to voluntarily choose to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court in the Federal Case
without reservation, pursue its claims in the Federal Case without limitation and then abandon
them in apparent favor of their pursuing them in a different forum. As the trial court recognized,
Stilv,ryn "chose to enter the fray in the Federal Case and must live with the consequences."
(R. Vol. 5 p. 1089.) The Page Respondents herein submit that the consequence of Stilwyn's
decision is the complete bar of those claims in these proceedings and request that this Court
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Page Respondents.
B.

The Doctrine Of Res judicata Is Fully Applicable To The Counterclaims That
Should Have Been, And Were In Fact, Asserted In The Federal Case.

As an alternative attack upon the determination of the District Court in these proceedings,
Stihvyn further argues that "this Court [has] held that the res judicata doctrine does not apply to
the litigation of counterclaims." (Appellant's Brief at p. 20) However, in its assertion of this
broad sweeping principle of law, Stilwyn overlooks that this Court's pronouncements in Joseph

v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 762, 472 P.2d 328 (1970), upon which it relies were specifically limited to
permissive counterclaims not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and which were
not actuallv litigated in the prior proceeding. Id., 93 Idaho at 765, 472 P.2d at 331. Neither of
these limitations apply in the present context, as it is clear that Stihvyn's claim for slander oftitle
did arise under the same transaction or occurrence which was the subject of the Federal Case in

RESPONDENTS OPENING BRIEF- PAGE 11
l 9285-00 l / 697952

the first instance and, even if it were not considered compulsory (which by Stilwyn's wholesale
intervention as a defendant, it was), was nonetheless, by Stilwyn's own admission, actively
pursued by it in the Federal Case.
Stihvyn's further reliance on Kootenai Electric Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar C01p., 148 Idaho
116, 219 P.3d 440 (2009) is likewise unsupportive of its attempt to excuse its active pursuit and
then abandonment of its claim in the Federal Case in favor of a subsequent suit. At no point in
the majority opinion in Kootenai Electric is there ever any discussion that a party to a litigation
must await the assertion of a claim against it before it is obligated to respond with any claims it
might have against that party. Rather, the majority opinion holds that Kootenai Electric Co-op
("KEC"), having detem1ined to assert claims against a co-defendant (Lamar), was thereupon
obligated to bring all claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which was the subject of
the litigation involving the two. As KEC had voluntarily chosen to actively litigate its claims
against Lamar in a prior federal matter, this Court held it could not assert in subsequent state
court proceedings an additional claim that it could have made but failed to pursue to finality in
the prior federal case. Thus, in addition to being factually inapposite to the situation presented
by Stilwyn in these proceedings, the guiding principle to be gleaned from the Court's analysis in

Kootenai Electric Co-op, is the very same principle that the trial court below recognized here,
i.e. that once a party detennines to enter the fray and pursue its claims against a party to the
litigation, it must assert all its claims or risk having those claims barred in a subsequent lawsuit.
Stilvvyn's reliance upon Joseph, supra, and Kootenai, supra, avails it nothing and this
Court should affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Page Respondents.
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C.

Even If The Declaratory Judgment Exception To Res judicata \Vere
Recognized, It \Vould Not Apply In This Case.

Stilv,ryn further urges this Court to excuse it from the bar of res judicata by requesting

that this Court recognize an exception to its application in cases where the prior suit was limited
to a declaratory judgment action as proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33.
'Wbile it is true that this Court has looked to the Restatement for guidance in matters of first
impression, this Court has repeatedly stated that such use should not be considered a categorical
adoption of all its provisions as each proposition advocated therein will be considered
individually by this Court. See e.g., Diamond v. Farmers Group Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149, 804
P.2d 319 (1990). However, consideration of this exception is unnecessary in the context of these
proceedings because Stihvyn would not be entitled to its application even if this Court were to
determine it to be an appropriate exception to the otherwise proper application of res judicata
principles.

Although Stilwyn seeks to characterize the Federal Case as one which "started and ended
as a declaratory judgment action" (Appellant's Brief at p. 28), the record reveals the contrary.
While it is true that the plaintiffs in the Federal Case initiated the action as one for declaratory
judgment, the defendant (FDIC) responded with a counterclaim for slander of title thereby
altering the character of the litigation between the parties. Upon its intervention in the Federal
Case, Stihvyn did not limit its participation to solely issues concerning the adjudication of the
plaintiffs' declaratory judgment but also, by its own admission, actively participated in the
pursuit of the slander of title claim. Furthermore, after the federal court's adjudication of the
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declaratory judgment claim, the case did not "end" as seemingly represented by Stihvyn. Rather,
the Federal Case did not reach its conclusion until after the federal court had entered its Order
that "the FDIC-R's slander of title claim shall be dismissed with prejudice, and this case shall be
dismissed in its entirety" which order was incorporated into a Judgment entered therewith. (R.
Vol. 2, pp. 349-350, 352.) The federal court subsequently entered an Amended Judgment which
recognized that in addition to the dismissal of the slander of title claim its prior Memorandum
Decision and Order which resolved "all other claims among the parties" remained in force.

6

(R.

Vol. 2, pp. 354-355.)
Accordingly, there can be little doubt that the Federal Case was not simply one for
declaratory judgment and the parties to that proceeding, Stilwyn included, certainly did not treat
it as such.

For this reason, Stihvyn's request that this Court consider the adoption of the

declaratory judgment exception to res judicata should be rejected as it would be without
application to it in any event.

In its Appellant's Brief, Stilwyn makes the assertion that this Amended Judgment should not be
considered a "final judgment". (Appellant's Brief, page 33-36) However, there can be no
question that the Federal Case acted as a dismissal with prejudice, nor does Stihvyn assert
anything to the contrary. Rather Stilwyn seeks to put itself in the seemingly contradictory
position of accepting the benefit of some of the provisions of the Judgment but not all. Having
voluntarily intervened in the Federal Case without limitation, it must thereby accept the
consequence of its complete dismissal with prejudice to include the conclusive and preclusive
effect of not only "every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also every
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Ticor, supra, 144 Idaho at
126, 157 P.3d at 620.
6
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The District
Entitled To
Preclusion.

Having demonstrated

That The
Respondents Were
Of The Doctrine Of Res judicata Based On Claim

the District Court properly applied the doctrine of claim

preclusion to Stihvyn's attempt to reassert the me claims in the State Case, the only issue that
remains is the appropriateness of the trial court's determination that claim preclusion barred the
assertion of Stihvyn's claims against

Page Respondents. Interestingly, Stih:vyn does not

make any assertion on appeal, as it did below, that the Page Respondents were not privies to
Anaconda/Portfolio such that they are not entitled to the benefits of claim preclusion in these
proceedings. See Ticor Title Co. v. Stanton, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007)
(claim preclusion applies to the same parties or their privies from the prior litigation). Rather,
Stilwyn's argument in this regard 1s solely focused upon IFB's relationship with
Ananconda/Portfolio and makes no

of the Page Respondents. (Appellant's Brief at 32-

33) Its argument in this regard is simply the extension of its previously advanced assertion that

as these individuals and entities were not parties in the Federal Case they cannot be considered
"opposing parties" such that Stilwyn was obligated to join these parties to the Federal Case in
order to bring these claims against them. (Appellant's Brief at page 26-27)
However, it should be noted it has been held that "an unnamed party may be so closely
identified with a named party as to qualify as an "opposing party" under Rule 13(a)."
Transamerica Occidental L[fe Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 384,390 (3d Cir.

2002).

In so concluding, the application of "opposing party" is interpreted broadly "for

essentially the same reasons that courts have interpreted "transaction or occurrence" liberally-
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to

to

policy

Ins. Co., 292 F.3d at 391.

Occidental

economy underlying

13 ." Transamerica

Accordingly, "[w]here parties are functionally

... , where an unnamed party controlled the litigation, or where ... an unnamed party
was the alter ego of the named party, they should be treated as opposing parties within the
meaning of Rule 13." Id.
In this regard, the allegations of Stilwyn's own complaint against

Page Respondents,

reveals that, as far as Stilwyn is concerned, these individuals are the functional equivalent of
AnancondaiP01tfolio, controlled the litigation involving AnacondaiPortfolio, or the alter ego of
Anaconda/Portfolio. (See, R. Vol. 1, pp. 70-96.)

While the Page Respondents denied the

assertions in Stilwyn' s Second Amended Complaint with respect to the alleged wrongful
purposes and design of their relationships with these entities, they do not deny their direct and
close relationship with AnacondaiPortfolio, whether as members, owners and/or managers. (R.
Vol. 2,

440-444.) Thus, Stihvyn simply caimot have it both ways. It cannot assert that these

individuals have such a close connection with Anaconda/Portfolio that they should be subject to
personal liability for Stilwyn's claims, but deny that they were so closely aligned that they
should be considered "opposing parties" despite their non-appearance as parties in the Federal
Case.
However, as noted above, Stihvyn's argument concerning the application of its "opposing
party" defense does not address the facts upon which the dismissal of the claims against the Page
Respondents was actually granted. (R. Vol. 5, p. 1097.) (stating "the parties here were either
parties in the Federal Case or in privity with the parties in the Federal Case") Accordingly, the

RESPONDENTS OPENING BR1EF-PAGE 16
l 9285-00 I / 697952

record remains unrebutted on appeal, just as it was when presented to the trial court in the first
instance, that these individuals derive a direct financiai interest from Anaconda!Pmtfolio's
participation in the Federal Case. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 440-444.) As the record stands unrefuted, this
Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of Stilvvyn's claims against the Page
Respondents on the basis of claim preclusion,.· regardless of any conclusion as to the
interpretation of "opposing party" presently urged by Stih7-,Yn in this case.

E.

The Page Respondent's Request Attorneys Fees and Costs.

As argued in the Page Respondents' Cross-Appellants' Brief, the Page Respondents
requested an award of attorney fees and costs based on Idaho Code 12-121. The trial court
denied the Page Respondents' request.

For the reasons advanced in the Page Respondents'

Cross-Appellants' Brief, the Page Respondents assert that this conclusion was in err and not only
should it be awarded attorneys fees and costs from the underlying proceeding, but the attorney
fees and costs they have incurred in defending this appeal as well.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Stilv,ryn voluntarily and with clear purpose intervened into the Federal Case between
Anaconda/P01tfolio. It did so based on its representation that it possessed an interest in the real
property secured by the subject loan that it alleged was being harmed by Anaconda/Portfolio's
continued assertion of an interest in the same real property. Its intervention was granted \Vithout
limitation or condition and its status in the case became as if it were an original party to the
Federal Case. Upon its intervention, it was no mere bystander and, consistent with that status as
a party to the litigation, Stilwyn by its own admission "actively pursued its rights against
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Anaconda under the slander of title claim." Stilwyn's voluntary decision thereafter to abandon
the Federal Case in favor of pursuing it again in the instant case was done at its own peril and

should not be excused from the proper application of claim preclusion to all of its claims against
the Respondents generally, but certainly to the Page Respondents specifically.
Accordingly, the Page Respondents request that this Court affirm the District Court's
grant of summary judgment on all of the Stilwyn"s claims against the Page Respondents.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this z.&'t;ay of August, 2014.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.

By-i::-S: ~

Richard H. Greener
Thomas J. Lloyd m
Attorneys for the Page Respondents
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